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Decision analysis methodology was applied to the problem
of some project management trade-off decisions required for
the Patrol Frigate (PF) Land Based Test Sites (LETS) . In
particular, the question of whether to install or simulate
the Mark 92 mod 2 fire control system, the AN/SPS~49 radar
and Lit 2500 gas turbine engine at the LBTS was studied. The
necessary decision analysis methodology required to
formulate and solve the problem was presented. The results
of this thesis indicated that the fire control system should
be partially simulated, the radar should not be installed
and the gas turbine engine should be simulated at their
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is general recognition in the armed services that
the management of projects concerned with weapons systems
development and production is an increasingly complex and
important task. The development and procurement costs of
major weapons systems have steadily increased over the past
ten years [Bef. 1]. Additionally, a need to reduce
Department of Defense (DOD) spending has been identified
many times by the President and other government officials
as well as concerned citizens. These problems are placing
an increasing burden on project management. The existence
of cost and schedule over-runs and performance,
maintainability, and reliability problems with the final
weapons system hardware indicates there is room for
improvement.
There are several areas in project management where
formal analysis can be of potential benefit to the project
manager, to the Navy and to the researcher. One such area
concerns how trade-off decisions are made among various
factors such as cost, performance, and schedule. A good
manager must have the ability to make reasonable judgments
in these areas. He must determine the realizable
alternatives and then select that alternative which best
satisfies the overall objectives of the project. These
judgments must often be made in highly uncertain
environments
.
An approach to aid the manager in trade-off decisions,
not typically used in the past, is the use of decision
analysis. Decision analysis is a systematic procedure to
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logically describe, specify and balance all factors which
affect a decision. Among the factors considered in decision
analysis is the probability that a specific outcome will
occur from the various possible consequences. The preferred
alternative also depends on the decision-maker's preferences
for those consequences. The techniques used in decision
analysis may enable a project manager to break a relatively
complex judgmental situation down to a series of simple
decisions.
A. PURPOSES
The purposes of this thesis were fourfold. The first
purpose was to demonstrate that decision analysis techniques
can be used as a project management tool. The second
purpose was to provide the author with experience in
conducting decision analysis in the project management
environment. This was particularly useful because the
research contained cases of multidimensional consequences
under uncertainty. The third purpose was to provide
examples of project management decision problems which could
be incorporated into the United States Naval Postgraduate
School's Adminstrative Science Curriculum. The forth
purpose was to generate interest in the use of decision
analysis in project management decision-making.
B. LAND EASED TEST SITE TRADE-OFFS
A current example of project management trade-off
decision making is the problem of what constitutes an
optimum mix of actual and simulated subsystems of the Fatrol
Frigate (FF) escort vessel which would be installed and
tested at a land based test site. The testing must be
satisfactory for PF production approval by the Defense
11

System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) . Consequently
three subsystems of the Patrol Frigate, the AN/SPS-49 radar,
the Mark 92 mod 2 Fire Control System (FCS) , and the LM 2500
gas turbine engine, were selected as examples of how
decision analysis can be demonstrated in this thesis. Four
alternatives were considered. They are
(1) installation of the actual equipment,
(2) installation of some actual and some simulated
eguipment
,
(3) installation of entirely simulated equipment, or
(4) no installation necessary at the land based test
site.
C. LIHITATIONS
There are some limitations to this thesis. It was
written in the decision environment of the project manager.
External influences such as political, social and cultural
factors were not included. Some generalizations were made
in order to maintain this thesis unclassified. Cost and
schedule parameters represent an order of magnitude and are
the results of experienced judgments of personnel from the
PF Ships Acquisition Project Office (PMS-399) located at the
Naval Sea Systems Command Headquarters. A set of utility
functions was developed for one individual concerned with
the problem to illustrate the method and use of decision
analysis. Finally, the preferences for consequences and the
assessments of judgmental probabilities were provided by
personnel in the PF Project Office. No refinements were




this thesis is organized in the following manner.
Chapter II presents a background of the Patrol Frigate Land
Based Test Sites (LETS) . Decision analysis methodology is
explained in Chapter III. This explanation includes
discussion of the systematic steps used in formal decision
analysis and the evaluation of multidimensional conseguences
under uncertainty. Formulation of the decision analysis
procedures used in deciding the alternative that best
satisfies the objectives of LBTS testing for the three PF
subsystems under consideration is described in Chapter IV.
Chapter V provides the solution procedures and the
recommended courses of action. Chapter VI summarizes the





On 13 July 1971, Deputy Secretary of Defense David
Packard created a major change in the DOD management of
major defense system acquisitions with the issuance of
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1. The Directive,
titled "Acquisition of Major Defense Systems," applies to
programs designated as major by the Secretary or Deputy
Secretary of Defense. This Directive recognizes that
sucessful development, production and deployment of major
defense systems are dependent on people, priorities and
clearly defined responsibility. To this end, the policy
invoked by this document designates the program manager as
the key individual accountable for a major acquisition
program. He should have a charter with sufficient authority
to accomplish his program objectives and sufficient tenure
to accomplish his task. The layers of management between
the program manager and his service should be minimized
£Eef. 2].
A. PF PROJECT
If a program results in an expenditure in excess cf 50
million dollars for research and development, or is in
excess of 200 million dollars during production or is urgent
to National Security it will be classified as a major
acquisition program. The Patrol Frigate Project has been




The objective of the PF Project is to acquire by the
late 1970's a class of ships which will provide, at least
cost, the maximum improvement in the Navy's surface
combatant capability to defend non-carrier forces against
airborne and sub-surface attacks.
The PF is an austere escort ship designed to provide
maximum mission capability within the constraints of average
follow ship cost of 47.7 million dollars (FY 73 dollars), a
full load displacement not exceeding 3500 tons and total
personnel accomodations not exceeding 185. Follow ship cost
is defined to mean the unit production cost of ships built
after construction of the lead ship.
2- The _DSARC R ev iew Process
There are four life cycle phases for a normal weapon
system acquisition program. The first phase is the
conceptual phase. The objective of this phase is to define
the operational need. The system concepts which warrant
development are explored. The second phase is the
validation phase in which alternative system concepts are
validated as a basis for determining whether or net to
proceed into full-scale development. The third phase is
full-scale development. The objective of this phase is to
design the system, construct a full-scale prototype for test
and evaluation and provide the documentation needed to
produce the system. The final phase is the production phase
in which the system is produced for operational use. Before
one phase is permitted to proceed into the next phase,




The DSARC review process occurs at three decision
point milestones during the normal life cycle of the system
development. These points in time are defined as
(a) DSARC I, which occurs between the conceptual and
validation phase,
(b) DSARC II, which occurs between the validation
and the full-scale development phase and
(c) DSARC III, which occurs between the full-scale
development and production phase.
Eefore a project can sucessfully pass the three
DSARC decisions, it must be increasingly better defined and
have minimized the technical uncertainty and program risks.
Test and evaluation, to the extent it can be performed in
each phase, is an important means for reducing such risk and
uncertainty.
3 • Test and Evaluation
Department of Defense Directive 5000.3 [Ref. 3]
establishes the policy for the conduct of test and
evaluation by the DOD components in the acquisition of
defense systems. The general policy is that test and
evaluation shall be commenced as early as possible and
conducted throughout the acquisition cycle to assist in
progressively reducing risks and assessing military worth.
The Directive defines Development Test and
Evaluation (DT&E) as the test and evaluation conducted to
demonstrate that the engineering design and development
process is complete and that the design risks have been
minimized. DT&E commences as early in the development phase
16

as possible after DSARC II to demonstrate that technical
risks have been identified and that solutions are in hand.
Prior to DSARC III, the DTSE accomplished should ensure that
the engineering is essentially complete and that all
significant design problems have been identified and have
solutions.
Operational Test and Evaluation (OTSE) is conducted
to evaluate the developed system's operational
effectiveness. The Directive specifies that acquisition
programs will be structured so that at least an initial
phase of Operational Test and Evaluation (IOTCE) will be
accomplished prior to DSARC III adequate to provide a valid
estimate of the expected system operational effectiveness
and suitability.
Department of Defense Directive 5000.3 further adds:
"The long, design, engineering, and
construction period of a major ship will normally
preclude completion of the lead ship and
accomplishment ot test therefore prior to the
decision to proceed with follow ships. In lieu
thereof, sucessive phases of Development Test and
Evaluation (DT&E) and Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E) will be accomplished as early as
practicable at test installations and on the lead
ship so as to rapidly reduce risks and thereby
minimize the need for modification to follow ships.' 1
4. PF Land Based Test Site Rationale
The DSARC II review for the Patrol Frigate Program
was held on 31 August 1972. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
issued a Decision Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.
In this Memorandum, one of the decisions reached by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense was that approval of follow ship
production should be contingent upon adequate test and
evaluation individually on subsystems and collectively at
land based test sites [Ref. H ]. In order to satisfy the
requirements contained in Refs. 2-4 described above, the
17

Project Manager has determined that the propulsion and
combat systems for the Patrol Frigate should be prototyped
at land based test sites (LBTS) .
The Propulsion System LBTS is now under construction
at the Naval Shipyard in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The
LBTS will consist of two LM 2500 gas turbine engines, one
reduction gear complete with high speed clutches and brakes,
one controllable reversible pitch propeller hub with dummy
blades, one shaft, a control system and a control station.
Figure 1 illustrates the Propulsion system arrangement.
The Combat System LBTS, is located at MacArthur
Field, Lcng Island, New York. Actual eguipment to be
installed consist of one AN/SPS-49 air search radar, one
AN/SPS-55 surface search radar, a Mark 92 mod 2 Fire Control
System, two AN/UYK-7 computers used as Weapons Control and
Support Processors and miscellaneous switchboards and
communications eguipment. Functional simulators will be
provided for the missiles, launchers, gun mounts, sonar and
electronics countermeasure eguipment [Ref. 5]. Figure 2
illustrates a block diagram arrangement of the Combat System
LBTS. It is to be noted that the location of the Combat
System LBTS is five miles from the coast line, surrounded by
trees and dwellings. This will limit low flying aircraft




































































B. A IBIS PROBLEM
*
The PF Development Concept Paper [Ref. 7] outlines the
following critical test and evaluation questions and issues:
(1) Are the individual combat subsystems to be
incorporated in the ship technically acceptable and
operationally suitable and effective?
(2) Does the integrated propulsion system installed at
the Propulsion System LETS demonstrate sufficient
performance and reliability to indicate that operational
requirements will be met?
(3) Is the integration of the various Combat Systems
through their respective interfaces adequate, in terms of
data transfer characteristics such as handling capacity,
rate and guality, to meet operational requirements?
(4) Do those operational characteristics of the
integrated Combat and Propulsion Systems, including
reliability and maintainability, which can be estimated
based on I01&E, show a reasonable probability that the ship
class when afloat will be able to satisfactorily accomplish
the mission for which it was designed?
One of the decision problems, then, for the PF Project
Manager was what the composition of subsystems should be in
the Combat and Propulsion Systems LETS so that "adequate
test and evaluation" [Ref. 4] with satisfactory results can
be supplied to DSARC III, scheduled for May 1975. The
installation and testing of these PF subsystems are to be
accomplished to ensure that the critical test and evaluation
questions outlined in the Development Concept Paper [Ref. 7]
21

are answered at minimum cost. Additionally, the primary
objective of the LBTS after DSARC III production approval
will be to verify operating, maintenance and test
procedures, to provide operational training and to test
system upgrading [Ref. 8].
the Project Manager was faced with a complex problem to
solve. The problem contains the multiple measures of
effectiveness of cost, schedule and future usefulness under
conseguences of varying degrees of uncertainty. It is this
problem which was used in Chapters IV and V to illustrate a
decision analysis approach to project management trade-off
situations. Chapter III contains a description of the
methodology necessary to formulate and solve the problem.
22

III. DECISION ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Han is often confronted with situations in which the
consequences of any action he takes are not certain. Events
may intervene which he can not control or predict with
certainty. A large number of decisions under uncertainty
are made by intuition [Ref. 9]. The intuitive decision
process is accomplished in the decision-maker's mind.
Because of this, there is no way to verify that this type of
decision is the logical consequence of the choices,
information and preferences that were available to the
decision-maker. For many problems, however, it is important
that the decision-maker is able to show people why he
arrived at a particular decision and also for them to be
able to see what changes in factors surrounding that
decision might have led to a different decision [Ref. 9].
Another characteristic of the intuitive decision process is
the human tendency to equate the quality of the decision
with the quality of the outcome it produces. For example,
consider a situation where an investor decides to buy some
new stock. If he loses money, the tendency is to say that
the investor made a bad decision; conversely, if he makes
money, then he made a good decision. A good decision is a
decision whicn maximizes the probability of a good outcome;
hence, making a good decision is no guarantee of a good
outcome. The decision-maker has control of the decision.
He does net have control of the outcome.
The purpose of decision analysis is to allow the
decision-maker to make consistent good decisions and to
formulate them in quantitative terms that can bo conveyed
from one person to another. Formal decision analysis is a
23

systematic process comprising the following steps:
(1) structuring the problem,
(2) assessing relative preferences for possible
conseguences,
(3) evaluating the probabilities for uncertainties and
(4) determining the best course of action from the
information in the preceeding steps [Ref. 10].
This process is an iterative process. First, a broad
description of the problem with rough assessments of the
preferences for the conseguences and probabilities fcr the
uncertainties is analyzed. On the basis of the first
analysis, alternatives are added or removed from
consideration. The measurements are refined and the process
is repeated until there is satisfaction with the results of
the analysis [Ref. 11].
The purpose of this chapter is to acguaint those
unfamiliar with decision analysis with its theory and
techniques to the extent necessary to formulate and solve
the PF Land Eased Test Site problem introduced in Chapter
II. This chapter is organized to explain the methodology of
decision analysis for each step in the formal analysis.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to explain certain terms
and notations which are used throughout the remaining parts
of this thesis.
A. CLARIFICATION OF TERMS AND NOTATIONS
The terms "is indifferent to", "is preferred to",
"lottery" and "utility function", are widely used in the
following sections of this thesis. For clarity, they need
to be explained. The term "is indifferent to" is to be used
to mean the same as the statement "the decision-maker is
indifferent to receiving either of the outcomes." The term
"A is preferred to B" is to be used to mean the same as the
2U

statement "the decision-maker prefers A over B."
The term "lottery" is defined as a gamble of some
*
uncertain event E where the prize X is won if the event E
occurs and the prize X is won if the event E does not
occur. Let p represent the probability that E occurs and
*
let 1 - p represent the probability that E does not occur.
Notationally, the lottery L will be represented as
E
<X ,p ,X >.
*
The term "utility function" is defined as a function u
which assigns a real value to every consequence a and t such
that u (a) is larger than u (b) if and only if a is preferred
to b [Eef. 10]. The notation u (a) is expressed as the
"utility of consequence a" and is represented by a real
number.
With the above terms clarified, the steps in a formal
decision analysis process can be explained. The first step
in this process is structuring of the problem.
B. PROBLEM STRUCTURE
In structuring a problem in which events are uncertain,
the options or alternatives are enumerated. Next, all the
events that can possibly occur are specified. As a last




A type of diagram known as a decision-flow diagram or
"tree" is a useful tool in decision analysis. It is a
chronological arrangement of the alternatives which are
controlled by the decision-maker and the events determined
by chance [Ref. 11]. To illustrate the construction of a
decision-flow diagram, consider the following problem. A
decision-maker is faced with two alternatives, I and II.
Both alternatives involve a situation where the outcomes a
or b are uncertain. If a occurs, then the decision-maker
must decide between alternatives III and IV. Alternative
III also involves an uncertain situation leading to either
the outcome c or d.
The decision-flow diagram is shown in Figure 3. Observe
that the branching points or forks are of two types:
decision forks and chance forks. A decision fork is
designated by a small sguare and a chance fork by a small
circle. There is additional information provided in the
diagram which will be discussed in the sections below.
With the alternatives and uncertain events described by
a decision-flow diagram, the next step in the decision
analysis process is the assessment of the relative
preferences for the consequences.
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF PREFERENCES
The establishment of preferences for the conseguences
provides the decision- maker with the basis for the rational
choice between the alternatives. This depends upon the
views and attitudes of the decision- maker . The consequences
may encompass a number of factors or attributes such as
cost, schedule and performance. These attributes might also







U (X ,x ,x ) =u12 3 1
Q: DECISION FORK
Q: CHAHCE FORK
U (X ,x ,x ) =u12 3 2
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U (X ,x ,x ) =u
1 2 3 4
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In this step in the decision analysis process, an
objective function is defined to indicate a measure for the
preferences for the conseguences.
A general methodology for defining an objective function
in decision analysis problems exists in the form of utility
theory. In this thesis no attempt is made to develop the
theory in detail. It will be developed only to the extent
necessary to formulate and solve the PF LETS problem. The
development draws heavily upon work by Giaugue [Ref. 12] and
Keeney [ Ref. 13].
Conseguences may be described by a single attribute or a
multiple set of attributes. Both situations are applicable
to the analysis in this thesis and are separately presented
below.
1 • Single, Attributes
In the case of a single attribute, an objective
function, hereafter called a utility function, can be
defined which has the property that the maximum expected
utility among the alternatives indicates the most preferred
action [ Ref. 12 ].
A utility function with a single attribute can be
constructed in the following manner. Define X and X as
the upper and lower limits over a range of possible
conseguences X such that X >X >X . For every possible
i i *




such that the decision-maker is indifferent to receiving X
i
for certain and receiving the lottery <X ,p ,X >. The value
i *
*
of p. ranges from zero to one, where by convention, u (X )
equals one and u (X ) equals zero [Ref. 12].
#
Once a set of points (X ,p ) have been established,
i i
a utility curve may be drawn. Figure 4 illustrates . three
possible utility curves. A utility curve generally has two
characteristics. It is smooth and the general shape of the
curve is either convex, straight or concave as illustrated
respectively by curves 1, 2 and 3 of Figure 4. Any break in
the curve would indicate either an inconsistency in the
choices for p in the lottery <X ,p ,X > used to assess the
i i *
points of the curve, or a quantum jump in preference for a
small change in X . A convex curve indicates a risk averse
i
behavior [Ref. 11]. That is, the decision-maker is more
inclined to take a consequence known for sure than to take a
gamble with the same expected value. A concave curve
indicates that the decision-^maker is risk seeking. He is
more inclined to take the gamble than to take the known
conseguence. A straight line indicates that the
decision-maker acts on the expected value of the conseguence
[Ref. 11]. He is neither risk averse nor risk seeking.
Once the utility curve is established for a single
attribute consequence, a value from one to zero is assigned
to eacli consequence correspondinq to the point on the curv.>.
29

A higher value for a consequence indicates greater
preference for that consequence than for a consequence with
a lower utility value. Reference 14 contains detailed
treatment of utility functions with single attributes.









The basic concept of the construction of a utility
function with a single attribute described above can be
generalized to the case where many attributes must be
considered. However, the above assessment scheme is
impractical. First, too many points must be assessed.
Secondly, humans find it difficult to think in terras of
multiple attributes. In decision problems under
uncertainty, many people when faced with situations where
30

more than one attribute is relevant, tend to pick the one
attribute judged most important to them and then make the
decision on that factor alone [Ref. 10].
There are procedures for decomposing a multiple
attributed utility function into combinations of
unidemensional functions. Conditions required for
decomposition include the properties of utility
independence, pairwise preferential independence and
pairwise marginality. These are described below.
Keeney [Ref. 13] shows that a multiattr ibuted
utility function can be expressed in one of two forms,
additive or multiplicative, dependent on which of the
properties of utility independence, pairwise preferential
independence or pairwise marginality hold. If a utility
function of multiple attributes can be expressed in these
forms, then the task of defining the utility function is
much easier. Suppose X = (x ,...,x ) describes a
1 n
consequence where u (X) denotes the utility of the
consequence X. Utility independence is defined in the
following manner. Let x
_
= (x ,..,x ,x ,...,x ). The
i 1 i-1 i+1 n
attribute x is utility independent of x if- the
i i
decision-maker's relative preference for x , with x _ held
i i
fixed, is the same regardless of the actual value of x
i
chosen. Order one mutual utility independence is defined to
mean that x is utility independent of x for all i. If
i i
order one mutual utility independence holds then u (X) can be
expressed in the quasi-additive form
n n n
U (X
, . . . , x ) = Z u (x ) + 2 Z c u(x)u(x)+....
1 n i=1 i i i=1j-1 ij i i j j
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Pairwise preferential independence is said to hold
if the trade-offs one is willing to make between attributes
taken two at a time, are not dependent on the values of the
remaining attributes. Let X =
ij
(x ,..,x ,x ,..,x ,x ,...,x ), and let x be a
1 i-1 i+1 j-1 j+1 n ij~
particular value from X
_. The attributes x , x are
ij i j
pairwise preferentially independent of X if one's
ij








If for any pair of attributes x and x , the lottery
i J
<(x ,x ) # 0.5,(x ,x )> is indifferent to the lottery
i J i J
< (x ,x ),0.5/(x ,x )> then pairwise marginality is said to
i J i J
hold [Ref. 12].
With the ideas of utility independence and pairwise
preferential independence presented, Keeney's results can be
more precisely stated [Ref. 13]. Let X = (x ,...,x ) be as
1 n
previously defined, with n > 3. If, for some x , x and x
i i j
are pairwise preferentially independent of
(x ,..,x ,x ,..,x ,x ,...,x ) for all j # i and x
1 i-1 i+1 j-1 j+1 n i
is utility independent of x , then either
i
u(X) = £ k. u. (x.) (1)




1 + K u(X) = TT [ 1 + Kk u (x ) ]i=1 i i i
(2)
where u and u are utility functions scaled from zero to
i
one, the k are scaling constants with < k < 1 and K > -1
i i
is a non-zero scaling constant. Equation (1) is the
additive form and equation (2) is the multiplicative form.
Given that the conditions of Keeney^s Theorem hold,
he provides a property required to show whether the function
is additive (1) or multiplicative (2) . He shows that if
pairwise marginality holds then the function must be
additive; otherwise, it is multiplicative. Tatle I





















Referring to Figure 3, there are three attributes
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x , x and x which describe each outcome of the tree. For
1 2 3
illustration, the following utility function might be used :
u(x ,x ,x ) = u(x ) + U (X ) + u(x ) = u .12 3 1 2 3 i
This utility function, in the additive form, maps the
conseguences x , x and x into a scalar value indicated by12 3
u , where i = 1,...,8, at each branch-tip of the tree,
i
D. JUDGMENTAL PROBABILITIES
The decision-flow diagram is one of the decision
analysis methods used in structuring a problem. Utility
functions can be used for the assignment of preferences for
the conseguences of the outcomes at each tip of the tree.
What remains to complete the information included en the
decision-flow diagram is the assignment of the judgmental
probabilities at the chance forks representing the uncertain
events. This is the third step in the decision analysis
process.
Raiffa [Ref. 11] addresses the guestion of whether the
decision-maker's hunches or vague impressions should be
calibrated, and if so, how this should enter into the formal
decision analysis process. He argues that if a
decision-maker wishes to act consistently, then he ought to
assign values to judgmental probabilities such that the sum
of the probabilities of an event occurring and not occurring
eguals cne. This judgmental probability assessment for an
event should not depend on the outcomes. He points out that
judgmental probabilities satisfy the usual rules of




Judgmental probabilities are used as a measure of the
decision-maker's beliefs concerning the uncertainty of an
event occurring, provided that these beliefs are
consistently applied to every uncertain event in the
analysis. They are assigned to each chance fork of the
tree. In Figure 3, they are represented as p , 1-p , p ,
1~P / P / 1~F / P and 1-p . With this information, the
2 3 3 4 4
final step in any iteration of the decision analysis process
is to determine the recommended course of action.
E. RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION
Determination of the recommended course of action
involves a seguence of calculations called by Raiffa [Ref.
11] the "averaging out and folding back" procedure. This
procedure is often referred to as the process of backwards
induction in the theory of dynamic programming [Ref. 11].
The procedure starts at the tips of the tree and consists of
computing the expected utility of each chance fork and the
selection of the greatest utility at each decision fork.
The process is repeated for each level of the tree until the
starting decision fork is reached. The alternative with the
greatest expected utility is selected as the recommended
course of action. The selection of the maximum expected
utility is an appropriate means of determining actions
consistent with the decision-maker's attitudes and opinions
[Ref. 12]. This point is presented and developed in such
sources as Schlaifer [Ref. 16] and Pratt, Raiffa and
Schlaifer [ Ref. 14 ].
To illustrate the "averaging out and folding back"
process, the information contained in Figure 3 is used.
Starting at the chance fork labeled (T) , the expected
35

utility is computed as
u p + u (1-p ) = E13 2 3 1
Moving backwards in the tree, the next fork encountered is a
decision fork, labeled 2 The value of E or u
,
1 3
whichever is greater, is selected. For illustration, E is
1
selected. Continuing backwards through the tree, a chance
fork, labeled (3) , is encountered. At this point, the
expected utility of the chance fork is computed as
E p + u (1-p ) = E .11 4 1 2
Alternative I has now been reached and the expected utility
of this alternative is E . In similar fashion, the expected
2
utility cf alternative II is computed. The results are
compared and the alternative with the greatest expected
utility is selected as the recommended course of action.
F. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER
On most occasions, people make decisions intuitively and
more or less inconsistently. There are occasions when the
decision must be made in a reasoned, deliberate manner.
Decision analysis methodology was introduced to provide
this. In the systematic process of decisicn analysis, the
decision-maker starts by structuring the anatomy of his
problem in a decision-flow diagram that depicts the
chronological interactions between his alternatives at any
stage and the events which are controlled by uncertainty. He
scales his preferences for the consequences at the tips of
the decision tree in terms of utility values and scales his
judgments abcut uncertain events in terms of probability
assignments at the chance forks in a consistent manner.
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Finally, he selects his best strategy for action by the
process of "averaging out and folding back."
Host "real life" problems are complex. Trees exhititing
the structure of these problems can be so complex as tc make
adetailed analysis of the alternatives impractical. There
is an "art" to analyzing real problems as described by
Baiffa [Ref. 11]. An iterative process is used. Initially,
alternatives and measurements are specified in a rough
manner. Freguently, some of the decision branches will turn
out to be nonoptimal and can be eliminated from the tree.
If the decision branch is close to the base cf the tree, a
sizable portion of the tree can be eliminated. After
elimination, further effort can be put into refining the
description of the remainder cf the tree. This iterative
process is repeated until the decision can be satisfactorily
made.
The necessary decision analysis methodology has now been
provided. Formulation and solution of the PF Land Based




IV. PF LBTS PROBLEM FORMULATION
Chapter II presented the background of the PF Land Based
Test Sites and developed the trade-off problem for the
Program Manager as to what would be the necessary mix of PF
subsystems which would be installed at the LBTS to insure
adeguate testing for the DSARC III review process. The
Project Manager has to make sure the testing of the
subsystems installed at the LBTS provide a valid estimate of
the expected system operational effectiveness and
suitability.
The Development Concept Paper [Ref. 7] lists in the Risk
Watch List the PF subsystems which are considered to have
some degree of development risk. Among these items are the
Mark 92/2 fire control system, the AN/SPS-49 radar and the
LM 2500 gas turbine engine. Individual Technical and
Operational Evaluation are to be conducted on the subsystems
listed [Ref. 5], but some seemed candidates for the Land
Based Test Sites including the fire control system, radar
and engine. In this chapter, the options for these three
subsystems are examined more closely using the tools
developed in Chapter III. This examination comprises an
initial analysis proceeding in the decision analysis steps
previously described. Considerable data for this analysis
was provided the author by the PF Test and Evaluation
Manager and the Assistant Test and Evaluation Manager during
interviews with them at the PF Project Office, by
correspondence and by telephone interview.
The first step in the decision analysis process is to
structure the problem in terms of a decision tree. The
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formulation of the problem structure is described below.
A. PROBLEM STRUCTURE
In testing of the Mark 92/2 FCS, SPS-49 radar and LM
2500 gas turbine engine, the Project Manager is concerned
with the installation and testing costs, the schedule, the
usefulness of the subsystems to the PF Project at the LBTS
in the future, and the uncertainty of passing DSARC III.
His options for all three subsystems, in general, are:
(1) install actual or simulated eguipment at the LETS,
(2) conduct at-sea testing of each subsystem during
Operational Evaluations,
(3) monitor tests at the vendor's activity or at sea or
(4) conduct no further testing.
To structure the LBTS problem, the options or
alternatives are enumerated. Next, all the events that can
affect the installation and testing of the subsystems are
listed and arranged in chronological order. Lastly, a
decision tree is constructed.
An intuitive process, in considering the options, was
suggested by the PF Test and Evaluation Manager. This
process is shown as a logic-flow diagram in Figure 5. To
enumerate the alternatives, the options displayed in the
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Basically, there are four alternatives considered.
The first alternative is to install the actual subsystem in
its entirety. The second alternative is to install a
completely simulated subsystem. The third alternative is to
install a partially simulated subsystem. The fourth
alternative is not to install the subsystem at the LBTS.
The above alternatives apply for the installation
and testing problem of the Mark 92/2 FCS. They dc not
entirely apply for the cases of the SPS-49 radar or LM 2500
gas turbine. The alternative of partially simulating some
components for the SPS-49 radar system was not considered.
It would be just as feasible to simulate the entire radar
system as to simulate some components such as the antenna
and transmitter. Therefore, three alternatives were chosen
for the AN/SPS-49 radar problem. They are: install the
actual eguipment of the radar, simulate the radar system or
not install the radar at the L3TS.
The alternative of partially simulating the gas
turbine engine was not considered because it does not make
sense to do so. The alternative of not installing the
engine at the Propulsion LBTS was also not considered since
the engines must be represented if there is to be a
Propulsion LETS. The assumption is made that the Propulsion
System LBTS is desirable and necessary for the development
of the Patrol Frigate. For the LM 2500 gas turbine engine,
two alternatives are considered. They are to install the
actual engine or to simulate the engine at the LBTS.
With the alternatives enumerated for the
installation and testing of the three PF subsystems at the
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LBTS, the events which affect them are specified and
arranged in time seguence.
2 . Events
The uncertainty of passing DSARC III scheduled for
May 1975 is the primary concern of the PF Project Officer.
The DSARC III review determines whether the PF development
risks have been minimized so that the PF Acguisition Project
may progress into the production phase. It is assumed that
the Patrol Frigate is a necessary addition to the military
posture for National Defense. If the DSARC III review does
not consider the technical and project risks tc be
minimized, DSARC III will be rescheduled after all the
deficiencies have been corrected. It will be at this point
where the decision tree structure will be cut-off in the
initial analysis of this thesis.
There are two events besides the DSARC III review
which must be considered in structuring the decision tree.
The first event is the LBTS Certification tentatively
planned for January 1975. The second event is the
Operational Assist which will be conducted by Commander
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR) during
the period February to Hay 1975 [Ref. 17 J.
LETS Certification will consist of a series of tests
conducted by the LBTS contractor to verify that the Combat
System subsystems and Propulsion System subsystems have been
successfully integrated, are operational and are ready to be
used for other demonstrations at their respective LBTS.
Certification will be approved by the PF Project Manager.
If the LBTS fails Certification, additional time and money
will be used to correct the deficiencies noted in order to
pass Certification. If funds are not sufficient to correct
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the deficiencies, the LBTS will have to be cancelled.
Another decision event occurs prior to
Certification. If there is enough time to do Certification
and Operational Assist, then Certification will commence as
scheduled. If there is not enough time to do both, then the
certification process will not be formally done and the
Operational Assist will commence as scheduled [Ref. 17].
An Operational Assist project is assigned by the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in response to a favorable
program initiation decision by the Secretary of Defense.
For the case of the Patrol Frigate, it was assigned by Ref.
4. The major purpose of an Operational Assist is to
establish confidence in the program worth and readiness for
the commitment of resources for full-scale development [Ref.
18]. A decision event occurs if the Operational Assist is
determined not satisfactory by the COMOPTEVFOR
representative. At this point in time, it must be
determined whether to correct the items which are
unsatisfactory or to cancel the LBTS. Table II summarizes
these events and their consequences in time sequence.
with the alternatives and the uncertain events
arranged in chronological order, a decision tree is




UNCERTAIN EVENTS OF LBTS
EVENT CONSEQUENCE TIME-FEAME
1. Time available If time available, Fall 1574
for certification do both; else.
and Op Assist do Op Assist.
2. Certification Pass or fail. If
passed, do Op Assist.
If failed, do over
or cancel LBTS.
January 1975
3. Op Assist Pass or fail. If
passed, do DSARC III.
If failed, do over
or cancel LBTS.
Spring 1975
4. DSABC III Pass or fail. If
passed, analysis done.
If failed, do over.
May 1975
3 . Decision^ Trees
Figure 6 depicts- a typical branch of the decision
tree for the alternatives of actual installation, partial
installation or simulation of the subsystems at the LBTS.
The first chance fork in the branch represents the
uncertainty of the time available for Certification and
Operational Assist. Only one alternative is selected at
this point. If there is time available, then the
alternative is to do both Certification and Operational
Assist. If there is no time available for both tests, then
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the alternative is to do Operational Assist only. The
second chance fork represents the uncertainty of
Certification. If it is passed, then the Operational Assist
is conducted. If it is failed, then a decision is made to
cancel the LBTS or do the Certification over. The third
chance fork of the branch represents Operational Assist
testing. If the Operational Assist is passed, then DSARC
III commences as scheduled. If the Operational Assist is
failed, then a decision is made to cancel the LBTS or do the
Operational Assist over at a later date. The final chance
fork is the DSARC III review. If it is passed, the most
preferred corseguence is achieved. If it is failed, then a
decision is made to either cancel the PF Project or to
reschedule DSARC III at a later date. As was pointed out
above, the assumption is that the Patrol Frigate is
essential to the National Defense posture, so that, in the
analysis, the "do over" branch will be weighted more
favorably than the "cancel" branch.
Figure 7 depicts the "no installation " branch of
the decision tree for the Mark 92/2 FCS and SPS-49 radar.
There is cne chance fork representing DSARC III in which it
is either passed or failed.
The structuring of the Land Based Test Site problem
is completed. The next step in the decision analysis
process is to evaluate the conseguences of the decision tree
in terms of utility numbers. This process is described
below where a set of utility functions for one individual
concerned with the problem is developed to illustrate the







TYPICAL LBTS DECISION TREE
INSTALL NO EQUIPMENT BRANCH
FIGURE 7
B. ASSIGNMENT OF UTILITY NUMBERS
In order to provide a basis for the rational choice
between the alternatives, utility functions are established
to indicate a measure for the preferences of the
consequences. The consequences for the LETS problem are
described by the attributes of cost, schedule and future
usefulness. A fourth attribute, performance, was a
possibility. It is assumed that all three subsystems will
have to meet some previously specified performance level;
therefore, a performance attribute was not considered for
this initial analysis.
The attributes which describe the consequences are
tangible and are measured in millions of dollars for cost,
months fcr schedule and scalar values for usefulness. The
scalar value for usefulness ranges from zero to three. The
value zero is assigned for a subsystem which is not
installed at the LBTS. The value one is assigned to a
simulated subsystem. The value two is assigned to a
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partially simulated subsystem and the value three is
assigned to the installation of the actual subsystem. Table
III lists the attribute ranges determined from interviews
with the PF Test and Evaluation Manager and the Assistant
Test and Evaluation Manager [Befs. 17,19], The values for
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Since a consequence for the LBTS problem is represented
by multiple attributes, the utility function will oe
described, in some form, by a combination of the individual
attribute utility functions. Once they are established, the
utility function might be expressed in the additive or
multiplicative forms exhibited in Chapter III dependent on
the properties of the attributes. Establishment of the
individual attribute utility functions is first discussed.
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1 • Individual Attribute ^Utility Functions
A discrete utility function consisting of four
points was established for the usefulness attribute in the
analysis of all three subsystems. A straight line utility
function for the schedule attribute for the SPS-49 radar
decision tree was derived and a family of four utility
curves was established for the schedule attribute describing
the conseguences of the fire control and gas turbine
decision trees. A straight line utility function
representing the cost attribute was derived for all three
subsystem decision trees. Table IV summarizes the results.
The method for arriving at these utility functions is
discussed in the paragraphs below.
The attribute of future usefulness consists of four
integers, zero, one, two and three. The utility of the
value zero is zero since it is least preferred and the
utility of the value three is one since it is most
preferred. To assess the utility of the values one and two,
the PF Assistant Test and Evaluation Manager was asked the
following guestions [Ref. 17]:
"If you are indifferent between the future
usefulness value one and the lottery <3,p ,0>, what do you
feel the probability p of getting a future usefulness value
three is?"
"If you are indifferent between the future
usefulness value two and the lottery <3,p ,0>, what do you
2




The reply to these questions was that p would be
0.5 and p would be 0.85. With this information, the
2
utility function for the attribute future usefulness was
evaluated. Given four discrete values, 0, 1, 2 and 3, with
u (0) = and u (3) = 1, then *
1 1
u (1) = 0.5 u (3) + 0.5 u (0) = 0.5
1 1 1
and
u (2) = 0.85 u (3) + 0.15 u (0) = 0.85,
2 1 1
A utility measure for the schedule attribute for the
three PF subsystems will not have similar worth. As was
disclosed in conversations with the PF Project Assistant
Test and Evaluation Manager [Ref. 20], the schedule for the
AN/SPS-49 radar is not critical. In assessing a utility
function for this subsystem, he would be indifferent to
gambles with respect to the schedule. He also indicated for
the Mark 92/2 FCS and gas turbine engine, their schedules
are very critical. If he is afforded a choice between a
gamble consisting of uncertain schedules and a schedule
which was kncwn, then he would take the known schedule in
every case, indicating a risk averse behavior. He added
that as long as the installation and test schedule were met
for DSARC III, he would evaluate the utility of any schedule
less than the maximum as one.
The ranges for the maximum and minimum schedule for
the radar are 1.5 and 4.0 months. Since the preferences for
schedule uncertainties for the SPS-49 radar are not risk
averse, a straight-line utility function can be used to
express the expected value for the installation and testing
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schedule. The straight line connects the point
(x =4.0, u (4.0)=0) with the point (x =1.5,u (1.5) = 1). Since
the function represents the expected value of the SPS-49
schedule, the equation of the utility function cf the
attribute schedule, u (x ) , will be
2 2









u (x ) = (4 r x ) / 2.5.
2 2 2
The utility function for the attribute schedule of







The LM 2500 gas turbine engine schedule ranges from
ten to sixteen months. The Mark 92/2 FCS schedule ranges
from 1.5 to six months. Because the schedule is critical
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for these two subsystems, there will be risk adversion
towards any gambles of uncertain schedules. A utility value
of one will be assigned to any schedule that is less than
the planned schedule for DSARC III. With this information,
the utility function curve for the fire control system would
be similar to one of the curves in the following graph.
Four utility values, as indicated on the graph, will be used







The curve for the utility function of the gas
turbine schedule would similarly look like one of the curves









Values for the utility function for schedule for the engine
and fire control system will be obtained from each of the
four curves of the two graphs above and used in the solution
of the decision trees to determine the sensitivity of the
results. If there is a significant difference in the
solution results between these values, then further research
in the development of the utility function will be required.
The evaluation of the utility function for the
attribute cost was next considered. The installation and
testing costs for the SPS-49 radar range from 1.5 to 3.5
million dollars. The LM 2500 gas turbine engine costs range
from three to fifteen million dollars. The Mark 92/2 FCS
costs range from 7.5 to 18.5 million dollars. The minimum
costs represent the best costs for installation and testing,
if all events are passed on schedule. The maximum costs
represent the worst costs as if all events are failed and if
no more funds are available to correct deficiencies.
It seemed plausible that one utility function for
the three subsystems could be derived where the costs range
from zero to 18.5 million dollars. From discussions with
the Assistant Test and Evaluation Manager [Ref. 20], this
seems to be a valid assumption. He is willing to take
gambles en the basis of the expected cost values over the
entire range for the three subsystems under consideration.
This is justified because a vast range of assets is
considered. A decision-maker, considering the vast amounts
of funds available, would not be necessarily risk averse.
It is realized that the cost decisions for each subsystem
would be made over a much smaller range as indicated for
each PF subsystem.
The utility function for costs was derived as a
straight line connecting the point (x =$18.5M,u ($18.5M)-0)
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with the point (x =$QM,u ($0M)=1). The equation cf the
utility function of cost, u (x ) , is
3 3
x =u(x)0 + [1-u(x)]18.5
3 3 3 3 3
= 18.5 - 18.5 u (x ) .
3 3
Hence,
u (x) = (18.5- x ) / 18.5
3 3 3
The utility function for the cost attribute is




With the individual attribute utility functions
specified, the utility functions for the fire control, radar
and gas turbine engine consequences can be represented as a
combination cf the three individual utility functions. This
utility function may be expressed in the multiplicative or
additive form dependent upon which of the attribute
properties of utility independence, pairwise preferential
independence or pairwise marginality hold. The next section






Attribute Applicable to Utility Function
1. Future usefulness: All u (0) =0.0
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MK 92/2 FCS
Gas Turbine




Cost All u (x ) = (18.5-x )/18.5
3 3 3
2- A ttribute_Properti.es
If the attribute properties of order one utility
independence and pairwise preferential independence hold for
the attributes cost, schedule and usefulness, then the
utility function can be expressed in the multiplicative
form. Further, if the property of pairwise marginality also
holds, then the utility function can be expressed in the
additive form. These forms are shown in Chapter III.
Verification of utility independence for the
attributes cost, schedule and future usefulness of the Mark
92/2 FCS problem is first considered. To verify utility

independence, consider the attribute cost of the Mark 92/2
FCS installation at the Combat System LBTS. The minimum and
maximum costs were determined to be 7.5 million dollars and
18.5 million dollars. The following question is asked [Ref.
15].
"Suppose the values for future usefulness and
schedule for the fire control system are specified at some
given guantity, say, three and 1.5 months. Now, consider
the gamble 7.5 million dollars with a probability of p and
18.5 million dollars with a probability of 1-p. Determine a
dollar amount X such that if you had to choose either the
gamble or the X million dollars for sure, you would be
indifferent. Now, suppose I give you a different set of
values for the other attributes, say, two and fifteen
months, and ask you to assess X again. Does the value of X
million dollars change?"
If the value of X million dollars does not change no Batter
what values are given for the usefulness and schedule
attributes, and if this is true for all gambles on the cost
attribute, then the cost attribute is utility independent of
the other attributes. Utility independence of the
usefulness and schedule attributes can similarly be verified
[Ref. 15]. If all of the attributes are utility independent
of the other attributes, then order one utility independence
is established.
1c verify pairwise preferential independence,
consider the attributes of cost and future usefulness for
the gas turbine problem. The following dialogue is held
[Ref. 15].
"Consider the consequence I, involving a four
million dollar installation and testing cost for the gas
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turbine engine, no future usefulness and an eleven month
schedule. Now, determine a dollar figure X such that
consequence II defined as; X million dollars, a maximum
future usefulness value of three and an eleven month
schedule, is exactly as attractive as consequence I. now,
let's change the value of the schedule attribute. Does the
value of X million dollars change?"
If the value of X million dollars does not change fcr all
values of the schedule attribute, and if this is true for
all trade-offs between cost and usefulness, then these two
attributes are pairwise preferentially independent of the
schedule attribute. Pairwise preferential independence
between the ether pairs of attributes is determined in a
similar manner [Ref. 15].
To verify pairwise marginality, a convenient test is
the pairwise marginality test [Ref. 15]. As an
illustration, the attributes of cost and schedule for the
SPS-49 radar consequences are considered. Let lottery L
1
yield 3.5 million dollars and a schedule of 1.5 months with
a probability of 0.5 and 3.5 million dollars and a schedule
of four months with a probability of 0.5. Let lottery L
yield 3.5 million dollars and a schedule of four months with
a probability of 0.5 and 1.5 million dollars and a schedule
of 1.5 months with a probability of 0.5. If the
decision-maker is indifferent between L and L , then
1 2
pairwise marginality holds between cost and schedule.
Similarly, the pairwise marginality tests are made between
all pairs of the attributes.
With the information gathered from interviews at the
5 7

Patrol Frigate Project Office, it was not unreasonable for
the author tc verify the properties of utility independence,
pairwise preferential independence and pairwise marginality.
It was determined that the properties of order one utility
independence and pairwise preferential independence hold for
the attributes. Pairwise marginality does not hold. This
result was the same for the three subsystems under analysis.
By Keeney's Theorem [Ref. 13], the utility functions for all
three subsystem problems can be represented in the
multiplicative form
3
1 + K u(x ,x ,x ) = .TT [1 + Kk.u.(x.)]12 3 1=1 11 l
where x ,x ,x represents the attributes of future12 3
usefulness, schedule and cost respectively. The utility
function of a single attribute x is represented by u (x )
.
i i i
In the assignment of utility numbers to
conseguences, the individual attribute utility functions
have been determined and the utility function, which is a
combination of the individual utility functions, can be
expressed in the multiplicative form. What remains is to
determine the scaling constants K, k , k and k so that the12 3
multiplicative utility function can be expressed in
numerical terms. This determination is made in the section
below.
3 . Assessment of Utility Function Pa rameters
A procedure for evaluating the scaling constants,
when the utility function is in the multiplicative form, is
found in Ref. 13 and Ref. 15. The basic idea is to define
four linearly independent eguations, since there are four
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unknowns, K, k , k and k to be evaluated [Ref. 15]. The12 3 J
following scheme is a convenient method for obtaining the
linearly independent equations.
Consider the outcomes described by three attributes
x . As a first step, the decision- maker is asked to rank
i
the attributes in order of preference. For illustration, he
ranks the attributes x such that x > x > x . The utility
i 12 3
values m will next be determined from five outcomes. Let
i
outcome X represent the best possible set of attributes
~1
* * *
(a ,b ,c ) . Let outcome X represent the worst possible set
5
* * *
of attributes (a ,b ,c ) . Then u(a ,b ,c ) = 1 and
* * *
u (a ,b ,c ) = 0. Let outcome X represent the set of
* * * ~2
attributes where the worst value for the least preferred
*
attribute, c , replaces c in the attribute set of outcome
*
* *
X such that X = (a ,b ,c ) . Similarly, let outcome X
^1 "2 * ~3
represent the set of attributes where the worst value for
the next least preferred attribute, b , replaces b , such
* *
that X = (a ,b ,c ) . Using the same conventions, let
3 *
* *
outcome X = (a ,b ,c ).
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To assess the utilities of the outcomes X , X and
~2 "3
X . the decision-maker is asked to determine the
~4
probabilities of the gambles in the following situations
where he is indifferent between:
(a) X for sure and the gamble <X ,c .X >,
2 1 2 "5
(b) X for sure and the gamble <X ,p r X > and
~3 "1 3 "5
(c) X for sure and the gamble <X ,p ,X >.
-4 * "14 "5
Cnce the probabilities p , p and p are assessed,
2 3 4
then
MX ) = pu(X) + (1-p ) u(X ) ,


















u(X ) = P u(X ) + (1-p ) u(X ) .
*-iT 4 1 4 5
Since u ( X ) =1 and u (X ) = 0, it follows that
1 5
u (X ) = p = m ,
~2 2 2
u (X ) = p = m and
~3 3 3
u (X ) = p = m .
~4 4 4
The utility values m , m and m can be verified for12 3
consistency by asking the decision-maker to assess other
gambles consisting of various combinations of the five
outcomes. If the decision-maker has been consistent, then
the utility values derived should be similar to the
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previously derived utility values m , m and m . If they12 3
are not similar values, the decision-maker is asked to
re-^assess all gambles until some consistency is achieved.
Table V illustrates the above steps.
TABLE V


















Once the utility value m for each of the five
3
outcomes are defined, the scaling constant K can be
determined from four linearly independent equations. Keeney
[Ref. 13] shows the following relationship holds for the
multiplicative form:
1 + K =
~f[ (1 + Kk. (3)
and, generally [Ref. 13];
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1 + m K = fl (1 + Kk ) / (1 + Kk ) .
1 i=1 i i
(<0
Equation (3) and equation (4) for j = 1, .-..., 3 are used as
the four linearly independent equations. From (3) and (4)
,
3
1 + K = .TT (1 + Kk )
= (1 + m K) (1 + Kk ) . (5)
j ' j
3




.TT (1 + .K) .|l (1 + Kk.) .
3=1 3 3=1 3
Then from (3) ,
3
3=1
(1 + k) 3 = JT (1 + m K) (1 + K)
and
3
(1 + K) 2 = TT (1 + m K) . (6)
Equation (6) is a cubic equation in the form,
K (aK2 + bK +c) = 0.
Thus, one of the values of the cubic equation is zero. The
other twc values are:
1/2
[-b ± (bz- 4ac) ] / 2a.
Keeney [Ref. 13] proves that the range for the values of K,
will be K > -1 where K * 0. Therefore, that value of K
which is non-zero and qreater than -1 is chosen. Giauque




Once the constant K is known, the remaining scaling
constants k , k and k are derived from eguation (5)
,
12 3
1 + K = (1 + m K) (1 + Kk ) ;
J J
Hence,
k. = (1 - m ) / (1 + m.K) .
D J D
(7)
Appendices A, B and C outline the steps and
computations made to determine the scaling constants for the
fire control system, the SPS-49 radar and the gas turbine
engine problem utility functions. The scaling constants are
listed in Table VI.
TABLE VI
SCALING CONSTANTS















The utility functions, using the scaling constants
from Table VI, are:
(a) for the Mark 92/2 FCS problem;





2 2 3 3
(b) for the AN/SPS-49 radar problem;
63

1-0. 52u (J)=[ 1-0. 1u (x )][1-0.18u (x )][1-0.36u (x ) ],
and
(c) for the LM 2500 gas turbine engine problem;
1 + 1.37u(X}=[ 1 + 0. 1u (x )][1+0.35u (x )][1+0.6u (x ) ].
~ 11 2 2 3 3
The utility of x , u (x ) , represents the utility of the
1 1 1
attribute future usefulness, u (x ) represents the utility
2 2
of the attrihute schedule and u (x ) represents the utility
3 3
of the attribute cost.
The second step in the decision analysis process has
been completed. Utility functions in the multiplicative
form have been derived so that utility numbers can be
expressed for each of the consequences indicating the
decision-maker's preferences for these consequences. To
complete formulation of the LBTS problem, judgmental
probabilities are assessed for the uncertain events of time
to accomplish tests, Certification, Operational Assist and
DSARC III.
C. ASSESSMENT OF JUDGMENTAL PROBABILITIES
By informal correspondence, the PF Assistant Test and
Evaluation Manager was asked to assess the probabilities for
the uncertain events for the installation and testing cf the
three subsystems under analysis. Table VII summarizes the
results of his reply. The probabilities indicated in this





JUDGMENTAL PROBABILITIES FOR LBTS PROBLEM
A. If_actual_eguipment installed
Probability of:
1. sufficient time for
Certification
3. passing Op Assist
given passed Certification




5. passing DSARC III if
passed Certification
and Op Assist
6. passing DSARC III if
passed Op Assist but
no Certification done
B. If ,,part_ of _system_simulated:
Probability of:




3. passing Op Assist
given passed Certification
4. passing Op Assist
given no Certification
done











5. passing DSARC III if
passed Certification
and Op Assist 0.6
6. passing DSARC III if
passed Op Assist but
no Certification done 0.1
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C . I f all of_system simulated
:
Probability of:




3. passing Op Assist
given passed Certification




4. passing Op Assist
given no certification
done 0.1 0.6 0.2
5. passing DSAEC III if
passed Certification
and Op Assist 0.1 0.5 0.5
6. passing DSAEC III if
passed Op Assist but
no Certification done 0.05 0.4 0.5
D. If_system_were_not_ installed at LBTS:
Probability of: MK 92 FCS SPS-49
1. passing DSAEC III 0.2 0.6
D. SUKHAEY OF CHAPTEB
The systematic process of decision analysis was used to
formulate the problem of deciding whether to install actual
subsystems, partially simulate them or simulate the entire
subsystem at the Patrol Frigate LBTS. The alternative of
not installing the subsystem at the LBTS was also
considered. Three subsystems were chosen from the Risk
Watch List for the analysis. They are the Mark 92 mod 2
fire control system, the AN/SPS-49 radar and the LM 2500 gas
turbine engine. In section A. of this chapter, the
structure of the problem was formulated in terms of a
decision tree. Figure 6 illustrates a typical branch of the
decision tree for the installation of actual equipment,
partially simulated equipment or simulated equipment.
66

Figure 7 illustrates the "no installation" alternative
branch of the decision tree. Section B. contained a
discussion of the second step in the decision analysis
process, assessment of the decision-maker's preferences for
the consequences. They are expressed in terms of utility
numbers. A utility function which assigns the utility
numbers to the consequences was formulated in the
multiplicative form. The equations derived are shown in
this section. Section C. comprised the third step in the
decision analysis process, assessment of the judgnental
probabilities for each chance fork of the decision tree.
Table VII lists these probabilities.
Chapter V contains a discussion of the final step in the
decision analysis process, determination of the best courses
of action using the information formulated in this chapter.
The word "final" implies that the process is completed when
the best course of action is determined. As was pointed
out, the decision analysis process is iterative. This
thesis represents the initial analysis of a complicated
problem. In the conclusion, Chapter VI, seme suggestions




PF LBTS PROBLEM SOLUTION RESULTS
All of the information required to solve the PF LBTS
problem, including a discussion of the alternatives and
consequences for each subsystem, and cost, schedule and
usefulness considerations have been provided in the
preceeding chapter. The functions which transform the three
attributes into a scalar measure of utility for the outcomes
were derived, and judgmental probabilities were assessed for
each uncertain event of the decision tree. All that remains
is to structure the decision tree, assign the appropriate
utility to each end point, insert the judgmental
probabilities at the chance forks and determine the expected
utility values for each alternative of the tree.
in this chapter, the solution results for the AN/SPS-49
radar, the Bark 92/2 FCS and the LM 2500 gas turbine
problems will be discussed separately. In each case, the
decision tree is provided before the results are discussed.
The decision trees presented are analyzed by computing the
expected utility of each chance fork and the selection of
the greatest utility at each decision fork. The process is
repeated for each level of the tree until the starting
decision fork is reached. The alternative with the greatest
expected utility is selected as the best course of action.
A computer program written in the BASIC language, was used
to perform the calculations.
A. SPS-49 RADAR
The decision tree for the AN/SPS-49 radar problem is
68

exhibited in Figure 8. The alternatives which were
considered are: installation of the actual equipment,
installation of simulated equipment or no installation. The
assessed judgmental probabilities are indicated near each
"Pass" and "Fail" of the chance forks. Table VIII lists the
outcomes for each of the twenty-six consequences and
provides the utility for each consequence. The utility
functions derived for the AN/SPS-49 radar problem are shown
in section B.3. of the previous chapter.
The sclution results are:
(1) the expected utility of the alternative,
installation of the actual equipment, is 0.76,
(2) the expected utility of the alternative, simulation
of the equipment, is 0.72 and
(3) the expected utility of the alternative, no
installation, is 0.81.
These results indicate that the recommended course of action




DECISION TREE SPS-49 RADAR
























OUTCOMES AND RESULTS OF SPS-49 DECISION TSEE
CONSEQUENCE OUTCOMES , UTILITY
Number IJsef ul ness Schedule Cost
(seal ar) (month) (million)
1 3 1.5 2.5 0.93
2 4 3.5 0.55
3 3 4 3.5 0.68
4 4 3.5 0.55
5 3 4 3.5 0.68
6 4 3.5 0.55
7 3 4 3.5 0.68
8 3 4 2.5 0.72
9 4 3.5 0.55
10 3 4 3.5 0.68
11 4 3.5 0.55
12 3 4 3.5 0.68
13 0.90
14 3 4 3.5 0.68
15 1 1.5 1 0.92
16 4 2 0.60
17 1 4 2 0.67
18 4 ' 2 0.60
19 1 4 2 0.67
20 4 2 0.60
21 1 4 2 0.67
22 1 4 1 0.70
23 4 2 0.60
24 1 4 2 0.67
25 4 2 0.60












B. MARK 92 HOD 2 FCS
The decision tree for the Mark 92/2 FCS problem is
exhibited in Figure 9. The alternatives which were
considered are: installation of the actual equipment,
partial simulation of the equipment, complete simulation of
the equipment and no installation. The assessed
probabilities are indicated near each "Pass" and "Fail" of
the chance forks of the tree. Table IX lists the outcomes
for each of the consequences and provides a range of
utilities for each consequence. Hecall that a family of
utility curves was established for the schedule attribute.
Hence, for the fire control system problem, four different
sets of points for the schedule attribute were used to check
the sensitivity of the shape of these curves on the
solution. The utility functions derived for the fire
control system installation problem are shown in section
B.3. of the previous chapter.
The solution results are:
(1) the expected utilities for the alternative,
installation of the actual equipment, ranqe from 0.38 to
0.63,
(2) the expected utilities for the alternative, partial
simulation of the equipment, range from 0.50 to 0.78,
(3) the expected utilities for the alternative,
simulation cf the equipment, range from 0.40 to 0.70 and
(4) the expected utilities for the alternative, no
installation, range from 0.43 to 0.67.
These results indicate that the recommended course of action
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is to partially simulate the fire control system to be
installed at the Combat System LBTS. They are consistent
over the entire range of the utilities. The different
shapes of the schedule attribute utility curve do not affect
the solution results.
C. LM 2500 GAS TURBINE ENGINE
The decision tree for the gas turbine engine problem is
shown in Figure 10. Two alternatives were considered. They
are: installation of the engines or simulation cf the
engines. The assessed judgmental probabilities are
indicated near each "Pass" and "Fail" of the chance forks of
the tree. The outcomes for each of the twenty-four
consequences and a range of utilities for the outcomes are
provided in Table X. As with the fire control system
problem, a family of curves was established to represent the
utility curve of the schedule attribute. The range of
utilities represent four different sets of points used to
check the sensitivity of the shape of these curves on the
solution results.
The solution results are:
(1) the expected utilities of installing the gas turbine
engines range from 0.19 to 0.35 and
(2) the expected utilities of simulating the gas turbine
engines range from 0.4 to 0.64.
The recommended course of action is to simulate the gas
turbine engine at the Propulsion System LBTS. These results
are consistent over the entire range of the utilities. The
different shapes of the schedule attribute utility curve do
not affect the solution results.
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DECISION TREE MARK 92/2 FCS











































CONSEQUENCE NUMBER, OUTCOMES AND RESULTS
FCS DECISION TREE
OUTCOMES UTILITY
Use Sched Cost 1 2 3 4
1 3 1.5 13.5 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
2 1.5 13.5 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
3 3 6 18.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
4 6 18.5 0.08 0.21 0.34 0.38
5 3 6 18.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
6 6 18.5 0.08 0.21 0.34 0.38
7 3 6 18.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
8 3 6 13.5 0.47 0.60 0.73 0.77
9 6 18.5 0.08 0.21 0.34 0.38
10 3 6 18.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
11 6 18.5 0.08 0.21 0.34 0.38
12 3 6 18.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
13 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
14 3 6 18.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
15 2 1.5 9.5 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
16 6 12.5 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74
17 2 6 12.5 0.48 0.60 0.73 0.77
18 6 12.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
19 2 6 12.5 0.47 0.60 0.73 0.77
20 6 12.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
21 2 6 12.5 0.47 0.60 0.73 0.77
22 2 6 9.5 0.58 0.71 0.84 0.88
23 6 12.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
24 2 6 12.5 0.47 0.60 0.73 0.77
25 6 12.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
26 2 6 12.5 0.47 0.60 0.73 0.77
27 1 1.5 7.5 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
28 1.5 7.5 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
29 1 6 12.5 0.40 0.53 0.66 0.70
30 6 12.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
31 1 6 12.5 0.40 0.52 0.66 0.70
32 6 12.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
33 1 6 12.5 0.40 0.52 0.66 0.70
34 1 6 7.5 0.57 0.70 0.83 0.88
35 6 12.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59
36 1 6 12.5 0.40 0.53 0.66 0.70
37 6 12.5 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.59















































CONSEQUENCE NUMBER, OUTCOMES AND RESULTS
GAS TURBINE DECISION TREE
NR OUTCOMES UTILITY
Use Sched Cost 1 2 3 4
1 3 10 14 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
2 16 15 0.11 0. 14 0.20 0.25
3 3 16 15 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.35
4 16 15 0.11 0. 14 0.20 0.25
5 3 16 15 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.35
6 16 15 0.11 0. 14 0.20 0.25
7 3 16 15 0. 19 0.22 0.29 0.35
8 3 16 14 0.22 0.25 0.31 0.38
9 16 15 0.11 0. 14 0.20 0.25
10 3 16 15 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.35
11 16 15 0. 11 0. 14 0.20 0.25
12 3 16 15 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.35
13 1 10 3 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
14 16 4 0.38 0.42 0.50 0.57
15 1 16 4 0.43 0.47 0.55 0.63
16 16 4 0.38 0.42 0.50 .57
17 1 16 4 0.43 0.47 0.55 0.63
18 16 4 0.38 0.42 0.50 0.57
19 1 16 4 0.43 0.47 0.55 0.63
20 1 16 3 0.46 0.50 0.58 0.66
21 16 4 0.38 0.42 0.50 0.57
22 1 16 4 0.43 0.47 0.55 0.63
23 16 4 0.38 0.42 0.50 0.57



















VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this thesis, decision analysis methodology was
applied to the problem of some project management trade-off
decisions reguired for the Patrol Frigate Land Based Test
Sites. In particular, the guestion of what PF subsystems
should be installed and tested at the LBTS's was studied.
This chapter summarizes the content of the thesis,
presents recommendations and provides suggestions for
further research.
A. THESIS SUMMARY
Chapter II provided the background of the Patrol Frigate
Land Based Test Sites. The DSARC review process was
introduced along with the reguired test and evaluation
reguirements necessary in each stage of the Patrol Frigate's
acguisition cycle. The problem of what the composition of
subsystems should be in the Combat and Propulsion System
LBTS so that adequate test and evaluation with satisfactory
results can be supplied to DSARC III, was provided as an
example to which decision analysis methodology can be
applied.
Chapter III supplied the decision analysis methodology
reguired to formulate and solve the PF LBTS problem
described in Chapter II. The steps in the formal process of
decision analysis were discussed. They are:
(1) structuring the problem in terms of a decision tree,
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(2) evaluation of the consequences in utility numbers,
(3) assignment of probabilities to the branches of the
chance forks of the decision tree and
(4) determination of the optimal strategy by the
"averaging out and folding back" process.
It was pointed out that the formal analysis is an iterative
process. First, a broad description of the problem with
rough assessments of the utilities and probabilities is made
to determine whether any branches at decision forks can be
eliminated or added. Next, the measurements are refined and
certain forks added or eliminated. This cycle is repeated
until there is satisfaction with the results of the
analysis.
.
The decision tree represents the chronolcgical
arrangement of the choices or alternatives controlled ty the
decision-maker and the choices determined by chance. The
evaluation procedures for the assignment of utility numbers
to each consequence were discussed. A consequence is
represented by a path through the complete decision tree.
The utility numbers are generated by a utility function
which transforms or maps the attribute describing the
outcome of a consequence into a scalar value. The
conseguences for a complex problem are generally described
by multiple attributes which complicate the construction of
the utility function. Simplification of the multiattribute
utility function was discussed utilizing the properties of
utility independence, pairwise preferential independence and
pairwise marginality. Table I summarized the properties
necessary for each type of utility function simplification.
The assessment of the judgmental probabilities to each
chance fork of the decision tree was then outlined. With
all the necessary information available for the decision
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tree analysis, the technique of "averaging out and folding
back" to determine the expected utility of each alternative
was described. The alternative with the greatest expected
utility is chosen as the recommended course of action.
The Patrol Frigate LBTS problem was formulated in
Chapter IV. This formulation encompassed the initial
iteration of a formal decision analysis process. The Mark
92/2 fire control system, the AN/SPS-49 radar and the LM
2500 gas turbine engine were the PF subsystems examined. In
the testing and evaluation process of these subsystems at
the LBTS, the Project Manager worried about the installation
and testing costs, the schedule for adequate test and
evaluation, the uncertainty of passing DSARC III review and
the usefulness of the subsystem at the LBTS to the program
after DSAEC III. His alternatives, in general, were to:
(1) install actual or simulated equipment at the LETS,
(2) conduct at-sea testing of each subsystem during
Operational Evaluations,
(3) monitor tests at the vendor's activity and at sea or
(4) conduct no further testing.
In passing DSARC III, the Project Manager is concerned with
the uncertainty of passing Certification and Operational
Assist prior to the DSARC III review. He is also uncertain
as to the availability of time to accomplish these test
requirements. These uncertainties were incorporated into
the decision tree structure as chance forks in the
appropriate order along the paths of the tree. The
alternatives chosen for the fire control system were to
install the actual equipment, partially simulate the fire
control system, simulate all of the eguipment or not to
include the fire control system at the Combat System LBTS.
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The alternatives chosen for the AN/SPS-49 radar were to
install the actual equipment, simulate the radar system or
not to include the radar at the Combat System LBTS. Two
alternatives were chosen for the LM 2500 gas turbine engine.
They were to install the engine or simulate the engine at
the Propulsion System LBTS.
Cost, schedule and future usefulness were selected as
the attributes describing the outcomes of each conseguence
of the tree. These attributes for the three subsystem
problems were determined to have the properties of first
order utility independence and pairwise preferential
independence. As a result, the utility functions were
expressed in the multiplicative form. The judgmental
probabilities assessed for each chance fork are listed in
Table VII.
With the decision tree structure defined, the utility
functions derived and the chance fork probabilities
assessed, each subsystem problem was structured in terras of
a decision tree in Chapter V. A computer program, written
in the EASIC language, was constructed to evaluate the
consequences of the tree in utility numbers and to "average
out and fold back" the tree to arrive at the expected
utility of each alternative considered. Tables VIII, IX and
X list the results. For the SPS-49 radar, the recommended
alternative was not to install the radar at the Combat
System LBTS. For the LM 2500 gas turbine engine, the
recommended alternative was to simulate the engine at the
Propulsion System LBTS. For the Mark 92/2 FCS, the





The decision tree analysis yielded several
recommendations which contrast with the alternatives
selected by the PF Project Manager. In actuality, it has
been determined that the SPS-49 radar and the LM 2500 gas
turbine are to be installed at their respective Land 3ased
Test Sites [Ref. 5]. A result of this thesis is that the
radar should not be installed and the gas turbine engine
should be simulated. It is recommended that these
alternatives should be further considered by the PF Project
Manager. In the case of the SPS-49 radar, it is net too
late to consider the alternative of not installing the
subsystem at the LBTS. Installation of the LM 25C0 gas
turbine engines is already in progress and it is, perhaps,
too late to consider its simulation. The alternative
selected for the Mark 92/2 FCS was to partially simulate the
fire control system which is in agreement with what was
actually decided. This alternative, however, was primarily
selected by the Project Manager because of the location of
the Combat System LBTS where, out of necessity, the missile
launchers and gun systems have to be simulated [Ref. 5].
The alternative of not installing the LM 2500 gas
turbine at the LBTS was not considered in the analysis. If
there is no engine, then there is no propulsion system.
This alternative, if considered, really leads tc the
guestion of the desirability of a propulsion system LBTS.
Rough data was available for consideration of the
alternative of installing no engine and the expected utility
of this alternative was computed. It was found that the
expected utility was greater than that of the other two
alternatives considered. This result would lead directly to
the recommendation that a Propulsion System LOTS would not
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be required. It is recommended that for future ship
acquisition projects, the desirability of a propulsion
system LETS be closely studied. A propulsion system LBTS
should not be preordained by the spirit of existing DOD
Directives.
The analysis of this thesis has shown some results which
are in contrast to the alternatives actually selected. This
thesis has shown that decision analysis can be a viable
decision-making tool for the project manager. It is a
stimulus to think about new alternatives. It allows the
decision-maker to scrutinize a problem as an organic whole.
Decision analysis provides the decision-maker with the means
to distinguish his preferences for consequences from his
judgments abcut uncertainties [Ref. 11]. Decision analysis
also allows the project manager to demonstrate that his
decisions were not made on a casual basis and that a
formalized decision approach was used. He can use the
analysis to communicate the rationale of the chosen strategy
to obtain support for his decision. It is recommended that
decision analysis methodology be incorporated more fully
into the project management environment. Raiffa [Ref. 11]
states:
"In my personal opinion. one part of thejustification for adoptina the methodology of decision
analysis is that the underlying behavioral assumptions
are appealing; a second part of the justif icaticn is
that this metnodology is an operational mode of analysis
(at least for many proolems, and the class is widenina)
:
and the final part of the justification is, what would
you do otherwise?"
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis represents an initial analysis cf a
complicated problem. Further research is necessary to
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refine the probability and utility measurements. In
particular, the effect of performance as an attribute should
be further studied. This is a very complicated area and
would make a thesis in its own right. The probability
assessments were made at the project manager level. These
probabilities could be further refined by assessing the
judgments of technical personnel located at the L3TS and at
the level of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
These assessments could then be compared and refined fcr the
next iteration of the analysis.
The tools developed in this thesis can be applied to
ether areas of system acquisition program management. Some
suggested areas are:
(1) an analysis of procurement contract alternatives of
a major weapons system acquisition,
(2) an analysis of the different options in the
selection of subsystems necessary for a ship or weapons
system,
(3) an analysis of the alternatives among different
types of hull platforms for a designated weapons system such
as the AEGIS system and
(4) an analysis of a centralized procurement plan for
material other than government furnished material versus the
alternative of independent procurement of materials by
several contractors for the same weapons system acquisition
project.
D. A CONCLUDING BEMAHK
It is hoped that this thesis has generated some interest
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in decision analysis in the project management environment.
The decisions required are complex and involve a great deal
of uncertainty in an area where cost and schedule over-runs
make it desirable that the option selected is the best
possible. The Congress and concerned citizens demand it.
Decision analysis is a tool that managers in the procurement
of major weapons systems can use. The ideas, of decision
analysis are relatively new but they are too promising to
ignore. Decision analysis can be experimented with by
applying it to selected problems on paper and comparing the
results with decisions that are actually made. If the
results are favorable or raise some valid questions not
considered, as in the example provided by this thesis, then




SCALING CONSTANT EVALUATION MARK ,92/2 FCS
The steps in evaluating the parameters of the utility
function for the Mark 92/2 FCS decision tree are outlined in
this appendix. This involves evaluation of the scaling
constants K, k , k and k of the utility function12 3
3
1 + Ku(X) = TT [ 1 + Kk u (x ) ].
i=1 i i i
Section E.3., Chapter IV, contains a description of this
process.
A. PREFERENCE RANKING OF ATTRIBUTES
The preferences for the three attributes were ranked by
the PF Test and Evaluation Manager as: cost is preferred to
schedule, and schedule is preferred to usefulness [Ref. 19].
B. DETERMINATION OF LINEARLY INDEPENDENT .EQUATIONS
To establish four linearly independent equations,
equation (3) , Chapter IV,
3
1 + K = TT (1 + Kk.)
and equation (4)
3
X (1 + Kk
i 3
1 + m K = TT ) / (1 + Kk ) f
j i=1
are used. The utility value m , where j = 1,.,3, is first
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determined by the assessment of gambles of the alternatives
listed below.
ALTERNATIVES USEFULNESS SCHEDULE ' COST
(scalar) (month) (million)
A 3 1.5 7.5
B 1.5 7.5
C 3 6 7.5
D 3 1.5 18.5
E 6 18.5
The gambles are assessed per the following table:
GAMBLE UTILITY (m )
J
C is indifferent to <A,.7,E>
D is indifferent to <C,.6,E>
B is indifferent to <A,.6,E>
C is indifferent to <B,.5 r D>
D is indifferent to <B,.5,E>
B is indifferent to <A,.8,D>
C is indifferent to <B,.3,E>
D is indifferent to <A r .4,E>
B is indifferent to <A,.9,E>
The utility of B, m , is selected as 0.88. The utility of































C. SOLUTION OF SCALING CONSTANTS
With m , m and m assessed, the scaling constant K can12 3
be determined from equation (6), Chapter IV,
3
r (1 + m
= (1 + .88K) (1 + .66K) (1 + .44K) .
(1 + K) 2 = TT . K)
Hence,
K (.26K2 + .26K-.02) = 0,
where K has the values 0, -1.08 and 0.07. Keeney [P.ef. 13]
shows that the value K which is nonzero and greater than -1
is chosen, therefore, K = 0.07 is selected.
Since the constant K is known, k , k and k can be
1 2 3
determined from equation (7) , Chapter IV,
Therefore,
and
k = (1 - m ) / (1 + m K) .
J J J





= (1 - .66) / [ 1 + .66 (.07) ]
= 0.42





SCALING CONSTANT EVALUATION SPS-49 RADAR
The steps in evaluating the parameters of the utility
function for the SPS-49 radar decision tree are outlined in
this appendix. This involves evaluation of the scaling
constants K, k , k and k of the utility function12 3
3
1 + Ku(X) = TT [ 1 + Kk u (x ) ].
i=1 i i i
Section £.3., Chapter IV, contains a description of this
process.
A. PREFERENCE RANKING OF ATTRIBUTES
The preferences for the three attributes were ranked by
the PF Test and Evaluation Manager as: cost is preferred to
schedule, and schedule is preferred to usefulness [Ref. 19],
B. DETERMINATION OF LINEARLY INDEPENDENT EQUATIONS
To establish four linearly independent equations,
eguation (3) , Chapter IV,
3





1 + o K = TT (1 + Kk } / (1 + Kk ) ,
j i=1 i j
are used. The utility value m
#
, where j = 1,.,3, is first
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determined by the assessment of gambles of the alternatives
listed below.
ALTERNATIVES USEFULNESS SCHEDULE COST
(scalar) (month) (million)
A 3 1.5 1.5
E 1.5 1.5
C 3 4 1.5
D 3 1.5 3.5
E 4 3.5
The gambles are assessed per the following table:
GAMBLE
B is indifferent to <A,.9,E>
C is indifferent to <A,.8,E>
D is indifferent to <A # .5,E>
B is indiffernt to <A,.5,c>
C is indifferent to <B,.8,E>
D is indifferent to <B,.5,E>
B is indifferent to <A,.8,D>
C is indifferent to <B,.7,D>
D is indifferent to <C,.6,E>>
The utility of B # m , is selected as 0.9. The utility of C,
1


































C. SOLUTION OF SCALING CONSTANTS
With m , m and m assessed, the scaling constant K can12 3
be determined from equation (6) , Chapter IV,
3
(1 + K)2 = .TT (1 + m.KJ
3=« 3
= (1 + .9K) (1+.8K) (1 + .5K) .
Hence,
K (.36K2+.57K+.2) = 0,
where K has the values 0, -1.06 and -0.52. Keeney [Ref. 13]
shows that the value K which is nonzero and greater than -1
is chosen, therefore, K = -0.52 is, selected.
Since the constant K is known, k , k and k can be
1 2 3
determined from equation (7) , Chapter IV,
Therefore,
and
k =(1-m)/(1 + mK)
3 3 3













SCALING CONSTANT EVALUATION GAS TUREINE ENGINE
The steps in evaluating the parameters of the utility
function for the gas turbine engine decision tree are
outlined in this appendix. This involves evaluation of the
scaling constants K, k , k and k of the utility function12 3
3
1 + Ku (X) = TT [ 1 + Kk u ( x ) 3-i=1 i i i
Section B.3., Chapter IV, contains a description of this
process.
A. PREFERENCE RANKING OF ATTRIBUTES
The preferences for the three attributes were ranked by
the PF Test and Evaluation Manager as: cost is preferred to
schedule, and schedule is preferred to usefulness [Ref. 19].
B. DETERMINATION OF LINEARLY INDEPENDENT EQUATIONS
To establish four linearly independent equations,
eguation (3) , Chapter IV,
3
1 + K = .TT (1 + Kk.)
and eguation (4)
3
1 + m K = TT (1 + Kk.) / (1 Kk ) ,
j 1=1 i j




determined by the assessment of gambles of the alternatives
listed below.
ALTERNATIVES USEFULNESS SCHEDULE COST
(scalar) (month) (million)
A 3 10 3
B 10 3
C 3 16 3
D 3 10 15
E ,6 15
The gambles are assessed per the following table:
GAMBLE UTILITY (m )
c is indifferent to <A, .5,E> m
2
= 0.5
B is indifferent to <A, .7,C> m
1
= 0.85
D is indifferent to <A, .3,E> m
3
= 0.3
c is indifferent to <B, .5,D> m
2
= 0.58
B is indifferent to <A, . 7, d> m
1
= 0.82
D is indifferent to <c. .6, E> m
3
= 0.34
c is indifferent to <B, . 6,E> m
2
= 0.51
B is indifferent to <A, . 8,E> m
1
= 0.8
D is indifferent to <B, .4,E> m
3
= 0.34
The utility of B, m , is selected as 0.85. The utility of





C. SOLUTION OF SCALING CONSTANTS
With m , m and m assessed, the scaling constant K can12 3
be determined from eguation (6) , Chapter IV,
(1 + K)2 = fr (1 + m .K)
3
= (1 + .85K) (1 + .55K) (1 + .35K).
Hence,
K (.16K2-.04K-.25) = 0,
where K has the values 0, -1.11 and 1.37. Keeney [Ref. 13]
shows that the value K which is nonzero and greater than -1
is chosen, therefore, K = 1.37 is selected.
Since the constant K is known, k , k and k can be
1 2 3
determined from eguation (7) , Chapter IV,
Therefore,
and
k = (1 - m ) / (1 + m K)
D 3 3
k = (1-.85) / [ 1+.85 (1.37) ]
= 0.07,
k = (1-.55) / [ 1 + . 55(1. 37) ]
= 0.26
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